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MOHAMED NADA
THE POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE OF 
IMPLEMENTING URBAN EXPANSION POLI-
CIES IN EGYPTIAN CITIES 
RÉSUMÉ 
La gestion de la croissance urbaine est essentielle à la prospérité et 
à la durabilité des villes, même si l’on a peu d’éléments sur les facteurs 
qui entravent l’application des mesures de régulation de l’urbanisation. 
Cette recherche se penche sur ces facteurs à travers trois dispositifs mis 
en place par le gouvernement égyptien : limite de croissance urbaine, 
planiication détaillée dans les zones d’expansion urbaine, et prélève-
ment sur les plus-values. La collecte de données a été effectuée selon 
une méthode qualitative. La démarche s’intéresse particulièrement 
aux capacités, comportements, interactions des acteurs à différents 
niveaux, ainsi qu’au rôle des agencements institutionnels formels et 
informels et à l’inluence de contextes politiques plus vastes sur les 
comportements et modes d’interaction des acteurs, en particulier après 
la Révolution du 25 janvier.
La recherche conclut à l’intrication étroite des facteurs faisant obs-
tacle à l’application des politiques étudiées. Parmi ces obstacles, on 
trouve principalement une longue tradition de centralisation, une 
faible coordination entre politiques mises en place au niveau national, 
de faibles capacités organisationnelles au niveau local, un cadre légal 
ambigu et obsolète, et un manque de coniance dans les gouverne-
ments élus et les fonctionnaires de l’échelon local. La Révolution du 25 
janvier a accru l’incapacité du gouvernement à appliquer les politiques 




Régulation de l’expansion urbaine, villes égyptiennes, limites 
urbaines, planiication, prélèvement sur les plus-values.
ABSTRACT
Managing urban expansion is very critical to cities’ prosperity and 
sustainability, however very little is known about the factors that hinder 
the implementation of policies formulated to manage urban expansion. 
This research explore these factors in relation to three policies imple-
mented by the Egyptian government, namely the application of: urban 
growth boundary, detailed planning in urban expansion areas, and 
betterment levy. The key methods used in the primary data collection 
were qualitative in nature. The research gives special emphasis to the 
impact of actors’ capacity, behavior, and modes of interaction at the 
different levels, as well as the role of formal and informal institutional 
set-up and wider policy setting on actors’ behavior and modes of inte-
raction, especially after the 25th of January revolution. The research 
concluded that there are number of interlinked factors hindering the 
implementation of policies investigated, most importantly are the long 
standing history of centralization, weak coordination between relevant 
policies at the national level, weak organizational capacity at the local 
level, ambiguous and outdated legal framework, and lack of trust in 
local government elected members and appointed oficials. The 25th of 
January revolution intensiied the inability of government to implement 
the policies examined and escalated the lack of interest in implemen-
ting them from the view point of land owners. 
KEYWORDS:
Urban expansion policies, Egyptian cities, Urban Growth Boundary, 
planning expansion areas, betterment levy.
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T here is a near consensus among scholars, policy makers, and urban residents that managing urban expansion is crucial. What is controversial, however, is whether it should be restricted or encouraged (Myers, 2001). Most 
views call for the adoption of policies that are geared towards achieving 
“sustainable urban expansion”, “smart growth”, and “compact 
cities” by increasing existing cities’ densities to reasonable levels, 
encouraging inill, re-use of infrastructure and previously developed 
land, implementing zoning and land subdivision regulations, placing 
urban growth limits, and land conservation measures (Cervero, 1995; 
Thomas & Cousins, 1996; Levinson & Kumar, 1997; Schwanen, Dijst, 
& Dieleman, 2004; Angel et. al., 2005). 
The proper application of these policies has been considered crucial 
as they are directly related to the achievement of sustainable develop-
ment and a wide spectrum of environmental, economic, and social 
issues, such as environmental conservation, city prosperity, quality of 
life, taxpayer protection, transportation planning, urban revitalization, 
environmental justice, affordable housing, and others. However, des-
pite the importance of the proper application of these policies, lite-
rature tends to focus on describing them rather than evaluating their 
impact or assessing the factors that affect their implementation (Hollis 
and Fulton, 2002; Bengstona, et. al., 2004). 
Three groups of policies could be identiied as aiming at managing 
cities’ urban expansion, they are: policies centering on limiting the 
rural−urban migration to some cities; policies aiming at managing the 
distribution of urban populations among cities; and policies focusing 
on managing urban development in individual cities and metropolitan 
areas (Angel et. al, 2005). 
Several policy instruments could be recognized, most prominently: 
public acquisition of land for managing urban growth and protecting 
open space; policy instruments addressing market failures by em-
ploying incentives or disincentives that affects behavior towards urban 
expansion (such as the introduction of development taxes, congestions 
tolls, or impact fees); policy instruments adopting a regulatory “Com-
mand and Control” approach, which entails an authoritative relation-
ship between the individuals or groups being regulated and the govern-
ment through the employment of sanctions in case of noncompliance 
(such as applying rate of growth controls, growth-phasing regulations, 
adequate public facility ordinances, up-zoning or small-lot zoning, 
minimum density zoning, greenbelts, and urban growth boundaries); 
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and inally through informational or awareness campaigns aiming at 
inluencing people behavior (this instrument is not commonly used).
URBAN EXPANSION AND URBAN EXPANSION POLICIES 
FOR EGYPTIAN CITIES 
The vast majority of cities in Egypt are located within the fertile Nile 
river valley and delta. This leaves about 93% of Egypt’s land vacant. 
This fact has signiicant ramiications: the increase in urbanization and 
the continuous population growth occur at the expense of existing agri-
cultural land. The pressure of urban expansion was further escalated 
by the inability of the government to formulate eficient and integrated 
policies and plans that channel urban expansion towards new cities 
(also known as desert cities).
The process of rapid urbanization was also accompanied by infor-
mal urban development, which has become a predominant feature of 
urban expansion in the last four decades. For instance, Greater Cairo 
in the 1950s was entirely formal, with a population of around 2.5 mil-
lion inhabitants. However, after the July 1952 Revolution, urbanization 
accelerated signiicantly under Naser’s socialist government which saw 
itself as the vanguard of development. As a result of informal urban 
expansion between 1981 and 1988, Cairo proper encroached on 340 
square kilometers of fertile agricultural land (El Araby, 2002), and this 
trend is continuing and an alarming rate of 0.8 % annually. 
Despite the importance of implementing policies aiming at mana-
ging urban expansion in countries of the developed and the developing 
world, very limited literature has been focused on the determinant fac-
tors affecting their implementation, especially in the context of cities 
of the developing world. This paper will aim at addressing this gap by 
assessing the key factors that are hindering the materialization of the 
intended outcomes of three policies adopted by the Egyptian govern-
ment to manage urban expansion within existing cities, namely the 
application of Urban Growth Boundary through the process of under-
taking city or village strategic plans (a regulatory policy); undertaking 
detailed plans for urban expansion sites speciied by the city strategic 
plan (a regulatory policy); and application of a betterment levy to cap-
ture the increase in value in the land that beneited from the change in 
the land use as a result of being earmarked as urban expansion areas in 
the city strategic plan (a market based policy).
URBAN EXPANSION POLICIES IN EGYPTIAN CITIES
149
THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH AND THE RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY
The aim of this paper is to explore power relationships and modes 
of interaction between the key actors involved in the implementation 
of urban expansion polices in Egypt. Emphasis will be given to the role 
exerted by the formal and/or informal institutions in shaping, channe-
ling, or constraining the choices of actors at the different levels, as well 
as the impact of the wider policy framework on the implementation of 
the policies under investigation. 
Three key methods have been used. First, a desktop review of the 
different laws and regulations governing the implementation of the 
three polices, as well as the legislation stipulating the role of the dif-
ferent actors involved in their implementation. The most important 
pieces of legislation reviewed were: the building Law no 119 for the 
year 2008 regarding the implementation of the application of the UGB 
and the detailed plans; the betterment levy Law no 222 for the year 
1955; property expropriation Law no 10 for the year 1990; the local 
administration Law no 43 for the year 1979 which explains the roles of 
governors, executive councils of the different local administrative units, 
and the elected local popular councils; and Law no 143 for the year 
1964 regarding property registration authority. 
The other two methods were semi-structured interviews and focus 
group discussions with key informants from the government, small-
scale landowners (deined in this research as owners having less than 
one feddan), and small-scale informal private developers. 50 interviews 
and 12 focus group discussions were conducted between April and 
December 2013. Key informants from the government included at the 
national level: the Minster of Local Development (MoLD) and 3 senior 
oficials from the Ministry; the Chairman of the General Organization 
of Physical Planning (GOPP) and 6 senior oficials from the organiza-
tion; the previous director of the Property Registration Authority; the 
director of the Local Administration Finance Section at the Ministry of 
Finance and 2 senior oficials from the Ministry. At the regional level, 4 
directors of the regional center of the GOPP were interviewed. 
Finally, at the local level, the key informants interviewed were: the 
governors of Luxor and Qalyubia; the general secretary of Luxor, Ismai-
lia, Garbaya, and Fayoum; the head of the General Department for 
Planning and Urban Development (GDPUD) of Fayoum, Beni Suef, 
Ismailia, Qalyubia, and Garbaya; the head of Property Registration 
Authority at Fayoum and Qalyubia and 2 senior oficials in each ofice, 
and the head of the Finance Directorate at the governorate level in 
Ismailia and Fayoum and 2 key informants at the Finance Department 
at the city level in each governorate. 
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Interviews and focus group discussions with key urban planning 
experts were also conducted, including interviews with: Dr. Abou Zeid 
Ragah (the former chairman of the Housing and Building Research Ins-
titute and currently a member of the Supreme Council of Planning and 
Urban Development (SCPUD); Dr. Ahmed Youssery (Dean of Faculty 
of Urban and Regional Planning – Cairo University); Dr. Ahmed Soli-
man (professor at Faculty of Engineering – Alexandria University); Dr. 
Mohamed Salheen (assistant professor at Ein Shams University), and 
Dr. Ayman Hashem (Faculty of Engineering, Assuit University).
The fourth section of this paper presents the key actors involved in the 
implementation of urban expansion policies in Egypt. The ifth section 
presents the empirical indings for each policy investigated in this re-
search, and the sixth section outlines a synthesis of the different variables 
that have impacted the implementation of these polices, and inally the 
last section concludes the paper and highlights areas for future research. 
KEY ACTORS INFLUENCING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
URBAN EXPANSION POLICES IN EGYPT 
The key actors involved the implementation of polices aiming at 
managing urban expansion in existing cities according to the current 
legal and institutional framework are: 
a) The SCPUD is chaired by the Prime Minister, relevant ministers, and 
urban planning experts. The SCPUD is mandated (among other 
functions) to: i) adopt general goals and policies for planning and 
urban development at the national level; ii) coordinate between 
ministries and bodies concerned with urban development and 
state land use; iii) suggest and to express opinion regarding draft 
laws pertaining to urban development; iv) evaluate the general 
results of implementing the national strategic plan, the regional 
strategic plans, and; v) approve the strategic plans for national 
and regional urban development and governorate plans.
b) The GOPP and its regional ofices. The GOPP is the state agency 
responsible for developing the general policy for planning and 
sustainable urban development. The GOPP reports to the Mins-
ter of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development and acts as 
the technical secretariat of the SCPUD. The GOPP also has a 
mandate to : i) develop the national program for the preparation 
of strategic plans for urban development on the different levels; 
ii) prepare the strategic plans for urban development on the na-
tional, regional, and governorate levels as well as the general 
strategic plans for cities and villages; iii) review, endorse, and 
URBAN EXPANSION POLICIES IN EGYPTIAN CITIES
151
monitor the implementation of general strategic plans for cities 
and villages and their urban areas; iv) improve and develop the 
capabilities of the urban planning departments in local units; and 
v) develop the implementation mechanisms of the strategic plans 
for the different levels and detailed plans. The GOPP has regional 
ofices in each of the seven economic regions. These centers are 
responsible for undertaking the competencies of GOPP in the 
region and provide technical assistance to the General Planning 
and Urban Development Departments at the governorate level. 
The Center shall also follow-up the preparation and implementa-
tion of city and village plans in such governorates.
c) The heads of the Local Administrative Units (LAUs): Egypt has ive 
types of LAUs. They are the governorate, the city region or the 
district (Markaz), the city, the neighborhood or the urban dis-
trict (Hay), and the local village administration. For each of these 
units, there is an appointed civil servant who is responsible for 
heading its executive council and insuring the proper implemen-
tation and provision of the different services. The Governor is the 
head of the LAU at the governorate level and is appointed by the 
president. The Prime Minister is responsible for appointing other 
heads of LAUs, with the exception of the head of the village who 
is appointed by the Governor. The accountability line between 
the heads of LAUs is hierarchal whereby the head of the lower 
LAU reports to the higher. In each governorate there is a GDPUD 
which is mandated to prepare detailed plans for cities and vil-
lages, through experts and consultants that are registered at the 
GOPP. The head of this department reports to the governor. 
d) The Local Popular Councils (LPCs): For each LGU, there is a LPC 
which is formed from directly elected representatives. The main 
function of the LPC is to hold the executives accountable for the 
delivery of the basic services and infrastructure in accordance 
with the competencies granted for each LGU. They are also res-
ponsible for approving the proposed budget and the proposed 
socio-economic plan of their administrative unit, as well as the 
detailed plans, including the plans for urban expansion areas. 
Prior the 25th of January Revolution, the vast majority of LPC 
members were from the ruling National Democratic Party, which 
was abolished along with these councils just after the Revolution. 
e) The private sector involved in urban expansion over agricultural 
land is predominantly composed of small-scale to moderate-
scale constructors. Very limited efforts have been dedicated to 
document the modality by which they function on the ground 
and the factors that affect their operation. 
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MAIN POLICES ADOPTED BY THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT 
TO MANAGE URBAN EXPANSION
Applying Urban Growth Boundaries (UGB)
Urban Growth Boundaries (UGBs) is a common planning tool used 
to demarcate limits for urban expansion over a particular period of 
time, generally 20 years (Calthorpe & Fulton, 2001). This policy is 
mainly used to control urban sprawl and leap-frogging by encouraging 
densiication and in-ill development, and to reduce the cost of infras-
tructure provision for the new expansion areas. More importantly in the 
Egyptian context, this policy aims at halting illegal urban expansion on 
precious agricultural land. 
According to building law, the process of specifying the delineation 
of the UGB is done as an integral aspect of undertaking the city strate-
gic plan and it circumscribes the entire urbanized area and demarcates 
new areas that will be added to the city for future urban expansion. 
These newly added areas are added based on an estimate of the expec-
ted population growth of the city in the coming 20 years as well as its 
current density. 
According to the building law, the process of undertaking the city 
strategic plan and the speciication of the UGB is administered by the 
regional ofice of the GOPP through consultants and in full participa-
tion of development partners (speciied in the law as being LPC, the 
civil servants at the local government level, civil society groups, and 
the private sector). The draft strategic plans for the cities and villages 
are presented to the community in a public consultation, presented to 
the governor and the LPC, and then approved by the Minister of Hou-
sing. The building law also stipulated that any developmental activity 
outside the UGB is considered illegal, unless a special permission was 
granted by the SCPUD. Governors are also authorized to issue a decree 
for demolishing violating construction activities on the expenses of the 
violator.
In practice, the process of undertaking city strategic plans and the 
identiication of UGB faces several dificulties in implementation. For 
instance, in the Greater Cairo Region, only six cities out of the 21 cities 
in peri-urban Cairo had an approved strategic plan and an approved 
UGB, while there are 13 cities in various stages of undertaking strate-
gic plans, and there are two cities that the GOPP has not yet started 
working on. 
Key oficials at the local government level have expressed their 
concerns regarding the delay in developing and approving the strategic 
plans. According to one oficial:
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“we started the process of undertaking the plan in 2009 
and until today it has not been inalized. This puts us under 
pressure with landowners in the urban expansion areas as 
they would require us to start a process of undertaking a 
detailed plan which will allow them to undertake land sub-
division and build formally. The delay in undertaking the 
strategic plans and the dramatic increase in the prices of 
land in the urban expansion areas drives land owners to 
build informally”. 
The sweeping change resulting from the 25th of January Revolution 
has had a signiicant impact on the spread of informal areas on the 
fringes of cities and villages. A Governor highlighted that:
“before the revolution [referring to the 25th of January] 
we were facing real dificulty in halting illegal building 
outside the UGB, but after the revolution things got really 
worse and governors feel powerless amid the huge pres-
sure exerted by land owners and the very limited power of 
the state to ensure the rule of law”. 
The feeling of powerlessness by the governors after the 25th of Janua-
ry has resulted from mutually enforcing factors. Among these factors 
was the rapid realization of citizens and traditionally non-vocal actors 
that they can collectively achieve substantial change from central or lo-
cal government if they were able to aggressively lobby the Governors, 
or other senior governmental oficials, through protests. From the other 
side, Governors view the central government itself as being in a very 
weak position and not being able to backstop them if they took deci-
sions that create tension at the local level, even if these actions were ai-
ming at insuring the rule of law or the achievement of the public good. 
The high mobility and coverage of media, especially satellite channels, 
in broadcasting what happens at the local level was perceived by the 
Governors and the Governorates’ Secretary Generals interviewed, to 
be unprecedented, and further escalating the lobbing power of citizens 
and increasing the vulnerability of local and central government to 
popular pressure. Social media was also suggested to play a signiicant 
role in bringing citizens together to lobby local government, as well as 
the live broadcasting of what occurs on the ground through cell phones 
and other available hardware.
One of the senior local government employees stated that what has 
occurred in the governorates after the revolution is: 
“shifting from one extreme to the other… Citizens have 
shifted from a total sense of helplessness and apathy to the 
total opposite where they feel that anything can be chan-
ged if they are able to come together… this sudden shift 
was not accompanied by an adequate understanding of 
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their rights nor the realization that with rights comes res-
ponsibilities as well.” 
Governors were forced amid these pressures to make compromises 
to citizens’ call for taking action, such as pressuring the central govern-
ment to expand the UGB, or in other cases making compromises by 
abstaining from taking action such as overseeing the illegal develop-
ment occurring inside or outside the UGB. One of the Governors stated:
“illegal building occurs just in front of my residence and 
I feel powerless to take action… this is really so embarras-
sing but this is what I am facing everyday… land owners 
and citizens at large become uncontrollable and they are 
realizing that we are not able to insure the rule of law so 
they want to quickly built informally and let us in the future 
deal with the status quo” 
Many landowners were able to sense this powerlessness of local 
government and they felt they should utilize this opportunity. One of 
the land owners explained further by stating:
“informal development led to nothing but more infor-
mal development, as we see that the government is unable 
to stop informal development, this gives us an incentive 
to build illegally, and in many cases those who violated 
the law by building informally were indirectly rewarded by 
including their land in the new boundary as the state is for-
ced to accept the reality on the ground and deal with the 
massive informality that became the predominant pattern 
in our cities”.
Prof. Ahmed Soliman, a prominent academician and expert in ur-
ban planning, argued that the main factor that delays the process of 
undertaking the strategic plan and the demarcation of the UGB is the 
contradiction between the government statements and its action with 
respect to the implementation of decentralization. According to him, 
the 1971 constitution and its amendments in 2007 called for adopting 
decentralization and the gradual shift of competencies from the central 
level to the local level. However, the process of undertaking spatial 
planning moved from a relatively decentralized process to a very much 
centralized one. 
The process of centralization and shifting competences from the lo-
cal level to the central level is clear when comparing the building law 
with the law which preceded it, which is Law no 3 for the year 1982, 
which gave the local government the responsibility of undertaking the 
general spatial plans for the cities and villages and the identiication 
of the UGB through technical support from the GOPP. Prof. Soliman 
stated: 
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“in the previous law the roles were set right. The local 
government led the process and the Minster of Housing 
should approve the inal outcome. However now with the 
Building Law, central government is in the driving seat in 
the preparation and approval of the plan and local govern-
ment role is restricted in providing inputs and suggestions”.
 
Dr. Nabil Hassib, a senior urban planning expert who has substan-
tive experience in evaluating cities’ strategic plans added that centrali-
zation of the process of undertaking the strategic plan and the specii-
cation of the UGB was not only restricted to developing the plan but in 
coordination with key actors sharing in the decision of the delineation 
of the UGB. He said: 
“consultants hired by the GOPP organize several mee-
tings with local government and development partners at 
the local level to solicit their inputs regarding the delineation 
of the UGB and then they submit the recommended boun-
dary to the GOPP, however their suggested boundary usual-
ly gets rejected by the Ministry of Agriculture or Ministry of 
Defense, and they are requested to change the proposed 
boundary again. Several requests were made to the GOPP 
for insuring the restrictions suggested by the different cen-
tral actors are communicated to the consults and the local 
government before the consultation process occurs at the 
local level, but this was seen as being not possible”.
Amid the calls for decentralization, there are several views that are 
critical about decentralizing the process of undertaking the cities strate-
gic plans to the governorate level, as a result of the limited trust and the 
limited capacity of local government. Senior oficials from the GOPP 
stated that:
“as a result of the change in the delineation of the UGB, 
some landowners could ind their wealth doubled ten 
times as a result in changing the land use of their land from 
agriculture to urban… To achieve that, landowners will 
be taking any approach to maximize their power in lob-
bing the elected members and the civil servants, and even 
our consultants to include their land in the new UGB... If 
the decision was given to the local government, I am very 
conident that the criteria for including land in the UGB 
will not be based on technical criteria, but predominately 
based on power dynamics at the local level”.
 
This view was not only suggested by oficials from the central go-
vernment, but also by many senior oficials from the local government. 
In an interview with the Governor, he stated: 
MOHAMED NADA 
156
“I am in favor of centralizing the process because 
if citizens felt that the power of drawing the new urban 
boundary became one of my competences, I can promise 
you that land owners will be demonstrating in front of the 
governorate building until all the agricultural land in the 
governorate change into urban usage.”
Focus groups with landowners also reinforced the hesitation in de-
centralizing the process of undertaking the strategic plan and the deli-
neation of the UGB, as they were skeptical the objectivity and impar-
tiality of local government, both from the executive and the elected. 
Several oficials from the local government were concerned about 
the technical ability of local government to undertake the detailed 
plans. The head of the General Department of Planning and Urban 
Department stated that: 
“if we [local government] are unable to undertake the 
detailed plan as stipulated in the Building Law, then it will 
be naive to request local government to undertake the 
strategic plan unless a complete reform at the local level 
occurred, and provision of needed human and inancial 
resources is undertaken”.
The debate around who should be specifying the new UGB is not 
the only debate, but also how much land should be added. In a focus 
group discussion with small-scale constructors involved in building 
residential houses, one of the constructor mentioned: 
“we do not know how they decide how much land is 
needed for the city to expand. We are told that the land 
included in the new boundary should be enough for the 
city to grow in the coming twenty years, however the 
reality is that even before the boundary is approved, the 
whole expansion area gets sold for urban use and is being 
built.” Another contractor added “the government should 
include in the new boundary at least ive times more land. 
The prices of the square meter can jump to ten and ifteen 
thousand Egyptian pounds which makes the prices of the 
building unaffordable for even the middle class”.
Key oficials from the GOPP refuted this claim and argued that the 
area included in the boundary is calculated to insure proper density 
within the city according to the population forecast. In addition, they 
suggested that efforts should be made to limit the urban expansion on 
the valuable agricultural land and that if Egyptian cities in the delta 
and the Nile valley continued expanding with the current pattern, the 
agricultural land in the delta will signiicantly shrink which will have a 
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signiicant impact on the economic base of these cities and the national 
food security at large. 
In an interview with Dr. Abou Zaid Ragah, he stated that: 
“all the efforts that we are doing to manage urban ex-
pansion in the existing cities are useless and Egypt has to 
plan for a major migration from the Nile valley towards to 
shores and deserts of Egypt. We have been locking our-
selves in the densely populated Nile valley and we are for-
getting that it is only six percent of the Egyptian land”. In 
another interview, Dr. Ahmed Yousry suggested that “Egypt 
really needs a national urban policy that states where are 
the new areas that are suitable for urbanization and how 
are we going to tackle urban challenges within the existing 
cities”. 
Key informants from the GOPP highlighted the importance of having 
a national urban policy as the policies that are currently being under-
taken are contradictory to each other and have developed without an 
overarching vision that direct their formulation and implementation. A 
senior oficial from the GOPP stated: 
“it is really odd that the two authorities that report to the 
Ministry of Housing are adopting two opposing policies. 
From one side the NUCA is building new urban commu-
nities and aiming at providing incentives to residents and 
investors to relocate to these new communities, however 
from the other side the GOPP is expanding the UGBs of 
the existing cities and by doing that creating incentives for 
the residents of these cities to stay within them and not to 
move to the new cities” 
The decision to violate the UGB and build over privately owned agri-
cultural land could be attributed to several factors, including the land 
market, the proximity of the agricultural land to the urban fringe, the 
connection of the land to roads and infrastructure. However, several 
local government oficials and landowners stated that the key factor that 
determine the decision to violate is the perception of land owners to the 
power of the Minister of Agriculture and/or the Governor in applying 
sanctions on the non-compliant, and they have attributed this in a num-
ber of cases to how land owners were very aware and sensitive to the 
change in the leadership within the Ministry or the governorate, and this 
leadership is always associated with the minster’s or governor’s compe-
tence, charisma, and the power of creating a change or stop violations. 
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Undertaking a detailed plan for urban expansion areas
The detailed plan is deined by the Building law as the executive 
plan for the building and planning regulations. It presents the different 
land uses and infrastructure suggested in the city or village strategic 
plan. The plan also contains all integrated urban design development 
projects, land sub-divisions and landscaping projects whose execution 
is suggested in the general strategic plan. 
The GDPUDis responsible for preparing the detailed plans for 
newly added urban expansion areas to the UGB, through experts and 
consultants registered at the GOPP. The governors are responsible for 
accrediting the detailed plans after being approved by the LPC of the 
governorate, and the approved plan is published in the oficial Egyptian 
gazette.
Detailed plans are crucial according to the Building Law; cities and 
villages will not be able to issue a statement for locations’ validity for 
building or issue building permits without the existence of an accre-
dited detailed plan. However, local government and citizens are facing 
real challenges in following the law since the vast majority of cities 
does not have an approved detailed plans for urban expansion areas 
(about ten cities have an approved detailed plan out of the 228 cities 
in Egypt), and the usefulness of these approved plans remains ambi-
guous and contentious when local government and land owners want 
to implement them on the ground.
The interviews with different actors at different levels illustrated that 
they have a mixture of complementary and opposing views regarding 
the reasons hindering the process of producing the detailed plans and 
insuring the technical accuracy and rigor of the inal product. From the 
point of view of the governors, the law has given the local government 
the responsibility of undertaking the detailed plans, however the cur-
rent legal and institutional framework did not insure the provision of 
the necessary inancial resources to do this. One governor mentioned: 
“the 2012 constitution stipulates that local government 
should be equipped with the inancial resources that would 
allow them to perform the tasks that have been assigned 
to them, but in reality this does not exist. I am requested to 
undertake detailed plans which could cost about three mil-
lion Egyptian pounds for cities in my governorate; however 
no one is pinpointing how I would be able to provide these 
needed resources”.
The inancial constraints are not the only challenge facing governors 
in undertaking these plans, but human capital is also a tremendous 
challenge. Most governorates do not create yet the General Depart-
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ment for Planning and Urban Development, and if they do exist they 
are severally understaffed. One of the governors mentioned: 
“the previous prime minster [referring to Dr. Ahmed Na-
zif] requested the GOPP to undertake the detailed plans 
for cities on our behalf when he realized the lack of the 
human resources that we are facing and how it impacts on 
citizens’ ability to gain permits for building houses in the 
new expansion areas.”
From the GOPP perspective, the building law is very clear in reques-
ting local government to undertake the detailed planning process, and 
limiting the role of the GOPP to the provision of technical assistance 
and backstopping to local government. A senior oficial from the GOPP 
stated that: 
“if we continue to undertake detailed plans on behalf 
of local government we will be working against the law. In 
addition, we are hoping the new law will provide a more 
decentralized approach in undertaking the plans by even 
pushing down the mandate of undertaking the detailed 
plans to the city level [not the governorate level]… many 
governors are asking us to undertake detailed plans on 
their behalf which is indeed an opposite trend of what the 
constitution and the government is aiming and hoping to 
achieve”. 
The debate around who should be undertaking the detailed plan is 
not the most important issue for most of the landowners interviewed. 
What really matters to them were how eficient is the process in al-
lowing them to issue land permits swiftly, as they perceived the whole 
process to be ineficient and full of legal and administrative constraints. 
During a focus group, one of the landowners stated:
“land owners build illegally not because they want to 
disrespect the law or the process set by the government… 
it is in fact the process and the requirements stipulated in 
the law that became disrupted in a way that is not respec-
ting the rights of land owners to use their assets or allowing 
them to secure a shelter for their sons and daughters”. 
Among the key constraints facing the preparation of the detailed 
plans and their relevance is related to land registration. Two impor-
tant actors are involved in land registration; they are the Real Estate 
Publicity Department (El Shahr El Akary or El Segal El Aynee), and the 
Land Survey Authority (Hayaat El Masaha). The irst actor is responsible 




During the interviews with the senior oficials for the GDPUD, they 
stated the coordination mechanisms between them and the actors in-
volved in land registration are very weak. For instance they argued that 
they cannot access the records of the Real Estate Publicity Department 
and that the law or the executive regulation did not specify any insti-
tutional linkages or mechanisms that can allow them to do so. They 
also highlighted that the Land Survey Authority is under the Ministry 
of Irrigation and their local branches does not report to the governors 
technically or administratively, which limits the ability of the depart-
ments under the Governor to coordinate with them. The same situation 
is applies to the Real Estate Publicity Department which is under the 
Ministry of Justice.
The dificulties resulting from the lack of coordination is further es-
calated by the fact the information available regarding the ownership 
of the land in the new expansion areas is outdated or unavailable. The 
GOPP and local government argue that the availability of updated land 
registration records is crucial given the main aim of the detailed plans 
is to divide the whole expansion area into blocks, streets, and areas 
allocated for public services, and without having a complete record of 
land ownership, urban planners can create real conlict between land 
owners as some of them will be disadvantaged more than the others by 
the creation of roads, services, and other utilities created for the public 
good. A senior oficial at the GOPP mentioned that: 
“if we completed a detailed plan without seeing land 
ownership, we may end up taking away the whole owner-
ship of a citizen or dividing his ownership into small pieces 
that are not suitable for building… we can also beneit 
some land owners by having their land facing a major road 
while harming others by having their land near an undesi-
rable service” 
In 2006 The Egyptian Government started an ambitious project for 
building a Nationwide Cadastral Information System. This project has 
come to an end, however. During interviews with key oficials from 
the Ministry of Justice and local government, they mentioned that the 
project’s aim has not been fulilled completely and there is a dire need 
to continue it with a focus on tackling the outdated legal framework 
governing land regeneration and titling, as well as the lengthy and 
complicated process of land registration.
Another key challenge facing the process of undertaking the detailed 
plans deals with the lack of clarity in the law and the guidelines regar-
ding the process of undertaking these plans and how landowners will 
be compensated in case their land is taken away to create streets and 
other public services. Oficials from the local government were divi-
ded into two groups, the irst suggested that local government can use 
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eminent domain to compensate land owners, while the other group was 
suggesting the land owners should donate one-third of their land, when 
they undertake land subdivision, for roads and public services, and this 
percentage should be enough for allocating the public services needed. 
The head of GDPUD in one governorate suggested that the building 
law was not clear enough to tackle these conlicting views. He also 
suggested that this debate on the ground is meaningless as from one 
side, local government does not have the inancial resources to use 
eminent domain and from the other side, land ownership has been 
fragmented in a way that most land owners do not have property large 
enough to be subdivided, and thus not allowing for a one-third of the 
land to be donated for public services. He stated: 
“some people argue that we can use eminent domain to 
compensate the owners that have lost their land or use the 
betterment levy to do that. However, we receive no money 
from the central government to allow us to use eminent 
domain and the betterment levy has not been collected for 
ages and we do not think we can apply it now, especially 
in these circumstances [referring to the post 25th of January 
Revolution].”
The frustration of landowners and local government oficials was 
not only related to the lack of clarity in the methodology governing 
the process of undertaking the detailed plans, but also dealt with the 
relevance of the building regulations presented in the law. These regu-
lations specify, among other criteria, the width of the streets, building 
heights, the percentage that should be allocated for open spaces, and 
the percent of the buildable area within the land plot. A senior oficial 
at the local government stated that: 
“those consultants who are hired to develop the de-
tailed plans are specifying building regulations as if they are 
planning a city in Europe and set very high standards and 
regulations. These experts are totally misunderstanding the 
context in the Egyptian cities and villages, the fragmentation 
of land ownership in Egypt, the dynamics of the housing 
market, and the informal building code se, and accepted 
by landowners and the small scale private developers. If the 
gap between the codes set by the detailed plans and those 
accepted by the land owners will not be narrowed down, 
we will continue developing plans that only looks like a 
nicely colored maps that are totally detached from reality”.
Consultants on the other side argued that they are only following the 
standers presented in the building law and its executive summary, and 
the draft detailed plans that they produce will not be approved unless 
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cleared by the GOPP and its regional ofices which insures the adhe-
rence to the stipulated standers in the law. 
One of the governors made a concluding remark regarding his pers-
pective on the challenges facing the preparation and implementation 
of the detailed plans, he stated that: 
“governors are in a very dificult position as they are 
requested to stop the illegal building, however the current 
legal and institutional framework does not allow the citizen 
to build legally…. It is us [the government] and our com-
plex and irrelevant legislations that drive citizens to build 
informally and if we do not tackle this issue signiicantly, 
then we have no choice except to issue illegal permits or 
just turn a blind eye when land owners build informally”.
The application of the Betterment Levy 
The betterment levy is deined as a “compulsory charge imposed by 
a government on the owners of a selected group of properties to defray, 
in whole or in part, the cost of a speciic improvement or services that 
is presumed to be of general beneit to the public and of special bene-
it to the owners of such properties” (IAAO, 1997). The application of 
this levy is present in many parts of the world, including developed 
countries like the United Kingdom, and in the developing countries 
like most Latin America countries. 
The main aim of the levy is to generate a revenue base that assists 
the government, especially at the local level, in resolving iscal space 
limitation when aiming at planning for infrastructure provision, as well 
as achieving progressive and redistributive outcomes from the capital 
gains resulting from the increment in property value that beneit cer-
tain classes of property owner as a result of governmental intervention 
(Latham, 1998).
The notion of ‘betterment’ or ‘value capturing’ is not new to the 
Egyptian legal framework as the betterment levy law no 222 was ori-
ginally endorsed in 1955. The law stipulated that the levy could be 
applied if the government undertook construction, extension, and/or 
modiication works of roads and plazas, sanitation projects, construc-
tion and/or modiication of bridges, grade crossings, and tunnels, or 
any other intervention by the state that results in betterment and is 
approved by the Cabinet of Ministers. The building law added that 
property beneiting from the process of undertaking the detailed plans 
would also be illegible for the application of the levy. 
Despite the long standing legal framework and the application of 
this levy in Egypt, most oficials at the local governorate level are over-
looking at its collection and/or assessing means to advance its cove-
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rage. In addition, very limited information is available on how this levy 
is collected in practice and the factors affecting its collection. Most res-
pondents interviewed argued that if the collection of the levy was acti-
vated, it could assist in tackling some of the long-standing challenges 
facing Egyptian cities, like the provision of basic services and avai-
ling land for public services. Also several respondents from the GOPP 
and the local government argued that the amount collected would be 
substantive as the price of the one feddan [4,200 square meters] could 
change from around two hundred thousand Egyptian pounds to four 
million LE. 
This research was able to document three interrelated indings re-
garding the application of the levy in Egypt, they are: the inconsistent 
application of the levy compared to law; the inadequate knowledge 
regarding the validity of applying it, especially in relation to the proper-
ties beneiting from undertaking the detailed plan in new urban expan-
sion areas; and the hesitation of local government to collect, or expand 
in collecting the levy in the near future. 
With respect to the irst inding, the way local government applies 
the levy was found to be inconsistent with the law. For instance, in 
most governorates included in this research, the law stated that the levy 
should be either paid immediately in cash, or installed in ten equal 
annual installations or given as part of the property equivalent to the 
amount of the levy. However the levy is collected in practice when the 
property owner applies to local units requesting building permits or 
requesting the supplying of public utilities. 
Another violation was found in several cities included in this re-
search where the levy was applied to all properties within the city, and 
not on properties in speciic sites. The local government argued that the 
government has provided various infrastructure projects which resulted 
in increases of property values within the city. However, the law was 
very explicit in the need for identifying the governmental interventions 
that has resulted in betterment. In an interview with a senior oficial in 
one of the governorates, he argued: 
“this might not be the best way to calculate the levy 
that should be collected, but given the current limitation in 
the capacity of local government to form committees that 
assess the betterment resulting from each project… the 
levy imposed is about 1-6 LE for each meter square, which 
is a very modest estimate compared to the real betterment 
occurred as a result of governmental interventions”.
The last violation reported was to the local administration law no 
43 for the year 1979 whereby the governorates or the cities transfer-
red the levy collected to local fund at the governorate or city level, 
MOHAMED NADA 
164
instead of considering the levy as one of the cities’ general revenues. 
This action cannot be understood without understanding the inter-
governmental budgetary structure in Egypt. According to this struc-
ture, the governorate is the only local administrative level that is reco-
gnized as a budget authority. This means that the governorate is the 
only unit that has the power to negotiate with the Ministry of Finance 
during the process of preparing the state annual budget where the 
central government decides on the amount of the transfers that will 
be allocated to each budget authority to ensure that its ability to cover 
foreseen expenditures. 
The implication of not acknowledging cities as budget authorities 
is that the head of the cities are forced to transfer all the revenues col-
lected to the governorate level, which acts as a melting pot for the dif-
ferent revenues collected by the cities and other local units. This in turn 
either, minimizes their motivation and interest to collect the levy and 
any other general revenue as they are transferred to the governorate 
level, or motivates them to violate the law and channel the collected 
levy to special funds, that are under their control. 
In a meeting with the head of the inance department in one of the 
cities he stated “if you are really requesting me to collect to apply the 
betterment levy, you have to tell me what is the incentive for me to 
collect it… all the revenues collected by the city are channeled to the 
governorate level. The governorate level revenues are a fraction of what 
is needed, and thus the central government has to provide a transfer 
that compensates this deicit. Heads of cities and villages do not see the 
value of applying the levy as they know that if they collected the levy 
they will not beneit from it directly, but if they did not collect it their 
deicit will be compensated by the central government”
With respect to the second inding, several local government ofi-
cials interviewed were found to have inadequate knowledge regarding 
the legality of applying the levy, especially in relation to the properties 
beneiting from the detailed plan undertaken in new urban expansion 
areas. The exception was found to be in Ismailia governorate which took 
proactive steps and consulted the Legal Advice (Fatwa) Department of 
the State Council. The Legal Advice (Fatwa) Department concluded that 
the legislator: 
“has decided overtly and frankly that the land under-
going improvement/betterment due to adoption of detailed 
plans of towns and villages – leading to its entry to the 
realm of boundary and consequently gaining hiking prices 
– shall be subject to imposed betterment levy whose rate 
will be determined in accordance with law 222/1955”. 
After receiving the legal advice, the Ismailia Governorate stared to 
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collect the levy in new expansion areas and senior oficials there believe 
it could support in tackling long-standing problems in expansion areas. 
During a focus group with key urban planning experts, that stated that 
most of the urban expansion areas that have been added to the cities 
are suffering from the availability of land for services, however most of 
the landowners will not be willing to donate land for building a school 
or any needed service by the community. One expert highlighted that: 
“in most cases, it is very dificult to take a part of land 
from the land owners for services as the land is already frag-
mented as a result of Nasser’s land reform. The most sui-
table case is to use eminent domain by expropriating the 
land from the land owners and compensating them with a 
fair price, which could be inanced by the betterment levy”.
A senior oficial from the GOPP attributed the leadership of the Is-
mailia Governorate to the investment made in the capacity of local go-
vernment there and the leadership of several governors who managed 
the governorate in the past twenty years. He stated:
“we [the central government] should be blamed for the 
limited investment in the capacity of local government and 
not equipping them with the needed legal and technical 
skills that enable them to fulill their mandates… the entre-
preneurial example that is led by the Ismailia governorate is 
resulting from the accumulation of capacity building acti-
vities that have been undertaken in this governorates as 
a result of several urban development projects that were 
implemented by different donors and UN agencies… also 
the leadership and charisma demonstrated by several well-
known governors who managed the governorate had a si-
gniicant impact on the attitude and capacity of employees 
there” 
The inal inding regarding the application of the levy in Egypt is 
related to hesitation of senior oficials at the local level to collect, or 
expand in collecting, the levy. For instance, the Governor of Cairo was 
forced to withdraw his decision as a result of the complaints made by 
the property owners who were requested to pay the levy. His main 
argument that the decision was suspend in order to re-study and avoid 
loading citizens with additional burdens, especially after the signiicant 
increase in unemployment and inlation that resulted after the 25th of 
January Revolution. 
During an interview one of the governors stated:
“We have been discussing the application of the levy for 
two months now, but we are very hesitant to apply it in the 
new expansion areas. Our fear is that landowners will resist 
this dramatically. The situation after the revolution became 
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so tense and we do not want to add more pressure”. Ano-
ther governor stated in an interview: “If I am not able to 
stop illegal expansion on the agricultural land, do you think 
I will be able to apply the betterment levy?... Landowners 
only feel that they have rights but they do not recognize 
that with rights comes responsibilities and the role of the 
government is to develop policies that insure social justice 
and equitable distribution of the government investments”.
A senior oficial from the central government highlighted the impact 
of legitimacy of the state actors and the social contract between the 
state and the citizens when assessing reasons for the hesitation in col-
lecting the levy. He stated: 
“the whole challenge around applying the levy is simi-
lar to deciding to cutting fuel subsidies in Egypt… there 
are technical and capacity dificulties, but these issues are 
not the real problem… the real challenge is the legitimacy 
of the regime… during the last years of Mubarak rule, his 
legitimacy was at stake because of corruption cases, the 
rising inequity between social classes, and the prospects 
of having his son ruling the country… now after the revo-
lution, the legitimacy is also the key factor but for different 
reasons, dealing mainly with the ability of the regime to 
represent the wider constituency and being able to deliver 
short-term results to restore the trust between the govern-
ment and the citizens” 
Some of the local planning experts highlighted the economic impact 
of the application of the levy and the potential correlation between the 
expansion in collecting it and the increase in land prices, which will 
eventually result in unaffordable housing. A senior local government 
oficial stated: 
“the square meter suitable for building in many cities 
of the delta can reach ten and even ifteen thousands, in 
areas that are within the boundary but are built informally 
without a detailed plan. If the detailed plan was really ap-
plied as the law stipulates [with speciic street width and 
building heights] and the betterment levy was applied, the 
prices of the houses will jump to levels that it becomes so 
unaffordable to the upper middle class in the delta”.
During a focus group discussion, all landowners who beneited 
from the increasing prices of their land as a result of changing its land 
usage were not interested in paying the levy. One of the owners argued: 
“we are the owners of this land and we don’t see the 
point of the government sharing with us a proit that we 
URBAN EXPANSION POLICIES IN EGYPTIAN CITIES
167
made from an inheritance we acquired from our ances-
tors”. Another owner added “it is the responsibility of the 
state to provide infrastructure and services, and for this rea-
son the state collects taxes from us… If the government is 
really interested in collecting more resources, they should 
better search for the multi-millionaires who made fortune in 
no time and escaped from the country after the revolution.” 
Small-scale landowners and private developers highlighted that 
they do not feel that they are treated equally and fairly when they are 
requested to pay the betterment levy for instance. Their justiication is 
that the neoliberal polices adopted by the state have resulted in subsidi-
zing the provision of infrastructure land to beneit the elites in the new 
urban communities, and thus there is inconsistency in the way the state 
deals with the provision of infrastructure and the expectations from 
small scale developers working in the existing cities and large scale 
developers operating in the new cities. 
KEY FACTORS AFFECTING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF INTENDED 
OUTCOMES OF URBAN EXPANSION POLICIES IN EGYPTIAN 
CITIES 
Preliminary indings presented in this paper indicate that there are 
several key constraints that affect the ability of the Egyptian government 
to implement policies set to manage urban expansion. The below inter-
related factors represent the starting point of a more in-depth research 
focusing on the role of institutions, deined by (Scharpf, 1997) as “a sys-
tem of formal and informal rules that structure the courses of action that 
actors may choose”, and the impact of the political economy within 
any given country on the process of implementation of urban expan-
sion policies in cities of the developing world. 
Administrative, iscal, and political centralization
The move towards a decentralized government in Egypt has been 
considered by several scholars as being largely rhetoric, and what hap-
pens on the ground is either a stagnant form of a centralized institutio-
nal set-up or even at shift towards more centralization. This could be 
evident in the UGB policy and the shift from a decentralized approach, 
presented in Law no 3 for the year 1982, that empowers local govern-
ment to specify the UGB with development partners at the local level, 
to a more centralized approach, as presented in the building law, that 




Centralization is not restricted to maintain competencies at the cen-
tral level, but in the case of undertaking the detailed plans, it was clear 
that the central government allocated this responsibility without clear 
identiication of the budget that will enable local government to per-
form this mandate. In practice, and given the very limited capacity of 
local government to collect revenues, the implementation of the de-
tailed plans remained as a product controlled by the GOPP. 
The dependency on the central government is not only restricted to 
inancial resources, but also in relation to human resources required to 
undertake the detailed plan. It was clear from the interviews that there 
is real shortage in number of well-trained technical staff, and in some 
governorates, the GDPUD does not even exist. 
The very limited collection of the betterment levy presents a dif-
ferent perspective in relation to the impact of the iscal centralization 
on the motivation of local government oficials to collect local taxes 
and levies. The dependency of local government on central transfers 
and their inability to use them in a lexible manner (between budget 
line items and between years) created a powerful disincentive to col-
lect these taxes and levies. 
The rhetoric around political decentralization and the role of the 
local popular councils is mismatched with the current model of local 
administration in Egypt, which is very hierarchal in nature. The local 
administrative units are headed by civil servants appointed by the cen-
tral government (with the head of the local administrative units at the 
village level who is appointed by the governor). This hierarchy and 
political centralization has reinforced upward accountability at the 
expense of representative democracy and the inclusion of citizens and 
non-state actors in the decision making process. 
Local government capacity
Interviews with different local actors suggested that Governors’ lea-
dership is considered one of the key factors that effect on the implemen-
tation of the urban expansion policies. On one hand, their connection 
with different central agencies could have a great impact on expediting 
the process of undertaking the strategic plan and identifying the UGB. 
On the other hand, landowners and private developers suggested that 
their perception of how serious and committed the governor is in insu-
ring the rule of law and preventing building outside the UGB or urban 
expansion areas without a detailed plan as the key deterministic factor 
inluencing their decision to build illegally. 
Several organization capacity challenges were noted in relation to 
horizontal linkages between key departments dealing with urban deve-
lopment of new expansion areas within the same local administrative 
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units. The lack of coordination was also noted to be more profound 
with the actors outside the control of the governor (such as the ofices 
of the National Survey Authority, the Real Estate Publicity Department, 
and other departments within the governorate). 
Different informants attributed the weak coordination between the 
departments within the governorate or with other actors outside the 
direct control of the governor, to the rigid and fragmented institutio-
nal set-up and the lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities. Other 
informants suggested that the main factor is the norms and rules of the 
game that govern the performance of civil servants which drives them 
to be less included to cooperate with other departments to achieve 
common targets. This is mainly resulting from the: fragile performance 
management system that acknowledges and rewards outstanding per-
formance and insures accountability in case of underperformance; the 
adoption of merit-based human resource management; and having a 
clear results-based monitoring and evaluation system. 
Technical capacity was also noted to be very limited in key depart-
ments such as the GDPUD as most engineers interviewed are in a dire 
need of training on basic software essential for their work and do not 
have the needed hardware that enables them to perform their basic 
tasks. Staff working in the Real Estate Publicity Department and the 
Land Survey Authority at the local level are still using mostly paper, 
despite the government efforts to introduce the usage of computer 
software. 
Weak coordination and synergy between national plans and 
policies
Several ministries and central authorities in Egypt are mandated 
to produce national plans and policies that have direct effects on ur-
ban expansion in Egyptian cites. The most prominent are: the Natio-
nal Socio-Economic Plan (produced by the Ministry of Planning); the 
National Strategic Spatial Plan (produced by the GOPP), and a set of 
sectorial plans and policies produced by the different sectorial minis-
tries and central authorities. To date, a challenge facing the Egyptian 
government is how to ensure the coordination and synergy between 
these plans and policies. 
A recent assessment was undertaken to explore the legal and insti-
tutional challenges that hinder the coordination between these plans 
and policies. It was concluded that the framework governing plan-
ning in Egypt (the Planning Law and the Building Law) is following 
two different and conlicting approaches to planning. On one side, the 
Planning Law integrates centrally between programs and projects, and 
inances their interventions through the state budget, however, with 
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very limited spatial sensitivity and inclusion of development partners 
at the different levels. On the other hand, the Building Law spatially 
integrates between the interventions of the different ministries in a spa-
tially sensitive manner but with no clear speciications on how their 
programs and the interventions will be inanced (Nada & El-Meghar-
bel, 2012). 
The lack of integration and connectivity between these two plans 
results in the allocation of investments by central ministries and agen-
cies that might not be consistent (or might even be contradictory) with 
the national, regional, or local strategic plans. In term, this will result 
in the establishment of major infrastructure and investment projects in 
metropolises and cities facing high density and the challenge of expan-
sion on agricultural land. 
The Supreme Council for Planning and Urban Development was 
established, according to Building Law, with the aim of coordinating 
between ministries and other actors concerned with urban develop-
ment and to endorse the objectives, and general policies for planning 
and urban development on the national level. However, since its in-
ception, the council has not contributed signiicantly in synergizing 
between the different actors involved in the planning process nor the 
different policies and plans produced dealing with regional and urban 
development, and instead most decision taken by the council were 
seen as being predominately operational. 
The absence of contemporary National Urban Policy (NUP) was 
seen by several experts as a key factor that restricts the synergy between 
the different national plans and policies. The only NUP that was drafted 
for Egypt was prepared in the 1970s and presented to the Ministry of 
Housing in 1982, and has not been updated since. 
Lack of clarity regarding the interpretation of the law and the 
skepticism regarding its relevance 
Evidence from the three case studies illustrated that laws set to im-
plement the three polices are seen as being ambiguous and confusing. 
Several committees were established by the successive Ministers of 
Housing to suggest amendments to the building law and its executive 
regulation, and several changes were introduced in the executive regu-
lation. Having said that, many legal and policy bottlenecks remain and 
there is no consensus around how to deal with them. Local adminis-
tration law is also outdated and not relective of the decentralization 
rhetoric presented by the central government. 
The availability of manuals and training materials that describe the 
law and present case studies that interpret its articles were found to be 
generally missing. In addition, training course and other capacity buil-
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ding interventions are predominately restricted to senior staff. 
Land owners and private developer’s unwillingness to comply
The underlying assumption is that property owners and private de-
velopers will be motivated to comply with urban expansion policies if 
they perceive it to be relevant and fair in relation to their values, prin-
ciples and inclinations, as well as their assessment of the repercussion 
of their noncompliance on their livelihoods. 
Most property owners and private developers interviewed were not 
willing to comply with the three polices under investigation in this re-
search. The reasons demotivating them varied to some extent according 
to the nature of the policy (being regulatory versus market-based), the 
capacity of the government to implement the policy, and their percep-
tion of the potential impact in case of non-compliance. 
For instance, in the detailed plan, most informants stated that lengthy 
process of preparing and approving the city strategic plans and detailed 
plans is a major turn off factor. In addition, the complicated require-
ments needed for issuing licenses or permits, such as the provision of 
a proof of a registered ownership, was seen as being not feasible in the 
Egyptian context. Equally important, property owners were found to be 
generally conident that the state will not be able to hold them accoun-
table if they violated the law and they were assured that they can get a 
way out through the prevalent red tape and extralegal practices. 
In the case of the betterment levy, it was clear that property owners 
were not willing to pay the levy as they do not see its purpose and ratio-
nale. The use of awareness-raising as one of the policy approaches to 
manage urban expansion does not seem to be a government priority at 
the different levels. The renegotiation of the social contract between the 
state and property owners and reexamination the rights and responsibi-
lities of the different actors was seen as a hypothetical and theoretical 
exercise that goes beyond the role and capacity of government, espe-
cially at the local level. 
Effectiveness of accountability mechanisms
The initial indings from the two regulatory polices investigated de-
monstrate very weak accountability mechanisms employed by different 
actors. Svara (1990) pointed out that one of the key competencies that 
should be undertaken by local elected members is their representation 
ability, and she distinguishes between two forms of representation: the 
irst is the ability is to act as a delegate for a special interest group and; 
the second is the ability to act as a trustee on achieving the public 
good for the entire constituency. These two roles should go side by side 
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and the elected members are expected to use their judgment in taking 
decisions that lead to the decisions in favor of the best course of action. 
Most citizens interviewed voiced that they were skeptical about 
how representative the members of the Local Popular Council were in 
relation to their wider consistency within the city or the village. Most 
citizens perceived their actions to be predominately motivated by self-
seeking interest and that their main locality is to their close relatives 
and family members, and thus not fulilling their trustee role. 
Skepticism in the capacity of local government was not only restric-
ted to the role of the elected members, but also to the capacity of the 
civil servants to insure the application of the law was also noted from the 
interviews. In general, landowners feel the local government is not in a 
position to control informal development, especially with the huge inan-
cial gains generated from changing the land from arable to urban land. 
Several cases of corruption in local government were also reported during 
the interviews and many landowners and private developers are stating 
that they are normally incorporating the cost of briberies in their budgets. 
National entities mandated for inspecting on local government per-
formance and the building regulation are also perceived by the local 
government oficials and land owners interviewed to be very fragile 
and centralized. An interview with a senior oficial in the Organization 
for Inspecting on Construction Work revealed several organizational 
challenges related to the limited human resources the organization has 
which is relected at the limited outreach in the different cities and vil-
lages. In addition, we also noted very limited coordination with other 
actors involved in the inspection on local government. 
Several youth and civil society initiatives that aim at tacking corrup-
tion in local government were noted on social networking websites. 
However citizens, landowners, and private developers interviewed 
were not aware of these initiatives or their impact on the ground. Fur-
ther research is needed to map out these initiatives and assess their 
strategies and how they are perceived by the different actors.
The wider political environment
Egypt moved away from state socialism and Nasser’s post-colonial 
nationalism with the beginning of President Anwar el Sadat (1970-
1981) and his Initah policy that aimed at encouraging foreign direct 
investment and better integration into the global market. This policy 
intensiied during President Hosni Mubarak who, in the mid-1980s, 
adopted a wide range of economic reforms and structural adjustments, 
which made Egypt one of the Middle East’s most prominent emerging 
economies and resulted in the creation of a record number of jobs 
(World Bank, 2009). Remittances from Egyptian working in Libya and 
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the Gulf countries remained and expanded during that era and had a 
very important impact on inancing cities’ urban expansion, which was 
predominately informal (Singerman, 2011). 
Amid this relatively favorable economic performance, inequity 
between the rich and the poor has been on the rise and the absolute 
number of poor people has been increasing. In addition, with the eco-
nomic liberalization the state started to withdraw from the provision of 
basic services (Yacobi and Shechter, 2005).
Opposition movements in the 1990s, mainly Islamist in orientation, 
started to gain momentum and power as a result of the state-adopted 
neoliberal policies, which resulted, among other factors, in a popu-
lar apprising on the January 25, 2011, that toppled Mubarak’s regime 
and brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power. The rule of the brothe-
rhoods gave little oficial attention to urban governance and the regime 
did not last for long as it was toppled was toppled by the military sup-
ported by popular demand and backstopped by key inluential actors 
in Egypt and in the region. 
The successive authoritarian and exclusionary regimes over the past 
four decades had a signiicant impact on the social contract between 
the state and the citizens; the role of different actors within the country; 
the perceived legitimacy of the state by citizens; and the ability of the 
state to enforce legislations and the rule of law (Bradley, 2008; Osman, 
2010; Singerman, 2011). Dorman (2013) presents an in-depth analy-
sis of the Egypt’s changing political economy since the beginning of 
the Nasser era, the impact on urban development in the country, and 
argued that “Cairo’s trajectory is best understood in the context of a 
durably authoritarian political order, rather than as Egypt’s itful experi-
ment with economic liberalization.” 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The lack of the government capacity to achieve the intended out-
comes from the policies investigated in this research cannot be under-
stood without critical examination of the long history of centraliza-
tion and its impact on actors’ behavior at the different levels. Central 
authorities have created and maintained interest in maintaining and 
increasing their power on the expense of local government, and the 
shift towards more centralization cannot in itself be understood wit-
hout analyzing the power dynamic between the different actors at the 
central level and their interest to defend and expand their powers. 
Evidence from this research argues that the central government has 
been traditionally maximizing their power at the expense of local go-
vernment, and while the rhetoric in the past decade has been in favor 
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of the shift towards a more decentralized government, in reality, central 
actors are in fact pushing towards more centralization. 
Local government, on the other hand, is suffering from a very limited 
capacity to manage urban development or the provision of services. 
They are not motivated, especially after the Revolution, to call for a 
more decentralized government. To governors, maintaining power with 
the central government reduces the pressure on them and provides a 
good excuse for poor delivery. Landowners and private developers trust 
in local government capacity – both in elected members of the popular 
council and civil servants – cannot be explained without fully captu-
ring the role of the context and impact of the authoritarian regime that 
has be governing Egypt since Nasser’s time, and the very limited space 
for civic engagement and social accountability. 
Finally, this research suggests that the decisions of land owners and 
private developers to develop informally cannot be seen as an ignorant 
act, but in fact a decision made by rational actors who are concluding 
that the beneits gained from building informally outweighs the gains 
from following the complicated and ineficient formal route.
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